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24 July 1963

MEMORANDUM - DCI's USE:

SUBJECT: Organization of DD/R

1. I have been reviewing in my mind the organization of DD/R and the countless discussions that I have had on the subject since I created the office 18 months ago.

2. My original concept was to pull scientific and technical talents of the Agency together in one office headed by the DD/R and thus provide more complete intelligence and cross-fertilization of our scientific talents on the one hand and, on the other hand, create a sufficiently large "magnet" to attract and offer an opportunity and a career to new highly trained technical personnel.

25X1 3. Scoville seized upon this and wrote out a bill of particulars for the Office of DD/R, the essential features of which were to transfer to DD/R, the OSI, most of TSD, [redacted] and certain other activities.

25X1 4. In addition, DD/R was to be a cover for U-2, CORONA, [redacted] OXCART developments and operations which were removed from DD/P.

25X1 5. Under this concept DD/R would be a very large unit in CIA and it would expand as new activities and responsibilities came along, not the least of which would be CIA's responsibilities in connection with the technical aspects of the national intelligence assets, such as NSA, NPIC, NRO [redacted]

6. In addition, of course, DD/R would carry the responsibility for CIA's relationship with NRO.

7. The organizational plan was questioned by a number of people, including the Kirkpatrick-Coyne-Schuyler Board, Kirkpatrick himself, Helms, Cline and even General Carter.

OPTIONAL SECURITY FILE

*DD/R Organization File*

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8. The reasons for the opposition appeared to me to be valid and were based primarily on the fundamental concept of organization of the intelligence establishment and specifically on the concept that the interface between DD/I and OSI, and between DD/P and TSD, were so important that to fracture it by moving these two units out from under their respective Directorships would incur great risk of impairing the fundamental missions of DD/I and DD/P, the success of which is basic to CIA's responsibility.



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10. While I have never been satisfied with the views expressed by the organization, the net effect of which was to reduce the scope of DD/R, nevertheless the arguments for leaving units where they are have been persuasive and therefore before making changes and a plan promulgated which approaches the original concept of DD/R, I wish to be sure we have satisfactorily answered the following:

a. If OSI is under DD/R, can I be absolutely sure that OSI will take directions concerning tasks envisaged by DD/I, that the support of DD/I and the Board of National Estimates and the components thereof is continuous, timely and uninterrupted under all circumstances, that there will be a proper integration of technical findings and reporting on Soviet missiles, space, nuclear weapons, etc. with corresponding economic and political opinions developed in OCI, ORR, etc, and finally that we will not have impaired the so-called "flow of information" essential to DD/I and BNE.

b. If the research and development of TSD is placed under DD/R, can DD/P always be assured of timely and adequate support in connection with their research requirements?

c. If the Automatic Data Processing Staff is pulled together as contemplated under DD/R (and this seems logical) would it break the line of command in all three Directorates so as to seriously disrupt the respective organizations. If such is the case, it might be that DD/R could own a small highly specialized computer planning staff that could direct the utilization

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of all of our computer assets. I frankly do not know enough about this problem to have an opinion but feel the subject should be studied in depth by those close to the problem before changing the organization structure.



11. I can see great advantages to the plan. I can also see dangers after a year and half of study (and the loss of Scoville because we refused to go this route), unless Cline, Helms and White are all aboard 100% and agree that the above questions have been satisfactorily answered.

JAM/mfb